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Abstract- Underground coal mines explosions generally arise from 
the inflammation of a methane/air mixture. This explosion can also 
generate a subsequent coal dust explosion. Traditionally such 
explosions have being fought eliminating one or several of the factors 
needed by the explosion to take place. Although several preventive 
measures are taken to prevent explosions, other measures should be 
considered to reduce the effects or even to extinguish the flame front. 
Unlike other protection methods that remove one or two of the 
explosion triangle elements, namely; the ignition source, the 
oxidizing agent and the fuel, explosion barriers removes all of them: 
reduces the quantity of coal in suspension, cools the flame front and 
the steam generated by vaporization removes the oxygen present in 
the flame. 
The present paper is essentially based on the comprehensive state-of–
the-art of Protective Systems in underground coal mines, and 
particularly on the application of Explosion Barriers to improve 
safety level in Spanish coal mining industry. 
After an exhaustive study of series EN 14591 standards covering 
explosion prevention and protection in underground mines, authors 
have proven explosion barriers effectiveness in underground galleries 
by Full Scale Tests performed in Polish Barbara experimental mine, 
showing that the barriers can reduce the effects of methane and/or 
flammable coal dust explosions to a satisfactory safety level. 
Keywords: Prevention and protection in underground mines, 
Passive water barriers, Spanish coal mines, coal dust explosion. 
1. INTRODUCCIÓN 
 
More than 100 years have passed from Courrières mine 
disaster in Northern France which killed 1,099 miners in 1906 
or in the worst mine explosion at Benxihu Colliery, China, 
which killed 1,549 in 1942 [1]. What had changed since that 
time, after a big effort in recognizing and implementing a 
prevention and protection means into mine practice? Answer is 
simple; such big catastrophes are very unlikely but even at the 
end of the 20th century whole mines with the whole crew were 
canceled by the coal dust explosions. Examples: June 1, 1988: 
underground brown coal mine Stolzenbach in Federal Republic 
of Germany, 53 fatalities, August 27, 1990: underground 
lignite coal mine Dobrnja in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 180 
fatalities, nobody survived, May 9, 1992: underground hard 
coal mine Westray in Nova Scotia (Canada), 26 fatalities, 
nobody survived. 
Causes of such impressing disasters are extremely simple:  
ignoring of elementary protective means and regulations. Such 
a statement is related to the coal dust explosion protection, not 
to methane one. First of all, the presence of coal dust layers in 
the workings is clearly visible, advanced monitoring 
instruments are required to control the methane content in mine 
air. Secondly, ignition energy of methane is extremely small 
(minimum ignition energy is 0.28mJ), for coal dust it is at least 
100 times greater. So, the number of methane explosions is 
much greater than coal dust ones. In the US coal mining 
industry, on the most safest in the world , in years 1980 – 2006 
it was 15 methane explosions with 106 fatalities , and 2 coal 
dust explosions with 15 fatalities only. It is very likely that at 
least part of the explosions recognized as methane ones were 
transformed into coal dust explosions. 
2. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF A COAL DUST 
EXPLOSION 
A coal dust explosion travelling along a roadway can be 
divided into several zones [2]: 
 Ahead of the blast the air is still. 
 As the explosion develops, the front of the blast becomes a 
‘shock wave’, similar to a nearby thunderclap or a 
supersonic ‘boom’ from an aircraft. It travels faster than 
sound, so it is not possible to hear it coming. The speed of 
the shock wave begins at about 360m/s for the weakest 
explosions up to 700m/s for fairly strong ones. In more 
familiar terms, these speeds are 1,300km/h to 2,500km/h. 
They can be even higher for extremely strong explosions. 
 The region behind the shock wave, ahead of the flame, 
experiences a cyclone-force wind. The air is thick with 
dust which has been scoured from every surface in the 
roadway. The dust concentration makes the air literally 
choking to breathe.  
Wind speeds range from 30m/s to 450m/s (108km/h to 
1,600km/h) for weak to fairly strong explosions. At these 
wind speeds nothing is safe. Heavy equipment is 
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overturned, wheeled equipment moves, spiral ventilation 
ducting unravels into ribbons of sheet metal, and anything 
loose becomes a missile. And it is all in the dark because 
of the thick dust. The distance between the shock wave 
and the flame front increases as the explosion travels 
further, since the shock wave travels considerably faster 
than the flame. 
 The flame travels at a speed slightly greater than the wind, 
but slower than the shock wave. (This means it travels in 
the dust-laden air, rather than in its own combustion 
products.) Speeds would range from just over 30m/s to 
530m/s (120km/h to 1,900km/h) for weak to fairly strong 
explosions. 
 Behind the flame the air is relatively still, but very hot. 
Shortly it will begin to cool and contract, tending to draw 
gas back. This will cause less violent movements back 
towards the point of origin of the explosion, followed by a 
series of decreasing oscillations 
3. PROTECTIVE MEANS 
The Couriers disaster showed the dominating role of coal dust 
in the mining explosion in the presence of the firedamp, even 
though as an explosion factor, it is not necessary for coal dust 
explosion to occur. To answer the above questions the simple, 
general model of an explosion of any flammable substance is 
very useful. This model relates to all explosion phenomena 
with combustion, not only in underground mining. Appearance 
of explosion requires the simultaneous appearance of five 
factors, forming the so- called explosion pentagon. [3]. 
 
 
Fig.1 Explosion pentagon 
 
Lack of one of the elements of the pentagon or braking 
connection between them excludes the explosion’s 
appearance. In the case of the underground coal mine this 
model says that: 
 Combustibles: coal dust and methane. Coal dust exists by 
its nature and participates in the explosion; methane plays 
also considerable role but rather as a primary explosion or 
as a constituent of hybrid mixtures. 
 Oxidizer is atmospheric air. 
 Ignition sources results from mining technology. 
 Underground mine workings are by their nature confined 
rooms where overpressure can grow, without dissipating 
as it otherwise would in open space. 
 Mixing of combustible and oxidizer or the forming of the 
dust cloud in air occurs in coincidence with ignition. In a 
normal state the dust cloud is not in explosion 
concentration range for the mine air; the presence of 
people in such a cloud of dust is not possible. 
 
PRIMARY EXPLOSION PROTECTION 
 
Primary explosion protection purposes at substituting 
something else for the flammable substances or the 
atmospheric oxygen or reducing their quantities to the point 
where there is no danger of an explosive mixture forming. 
Increased air circulation, air flushing through ventilation can 
be achieved by structural measures. Replacing the atmospheric 
oxygen is not an option for areas where people work.  
Much research has been carried out in Europe and elsewhere 
to understand how to control these dangers, but explosions 
still occur. In the coal mining industry, a methane explosion 
can initiate a coal dust explosion, which can then engulf an 
entire pit working. Stone dust is spread along mine roadways, 
or suspended from trays in the roof, so as to dilute the coal 
dust raised ahead of the combustion zone by the shock wave, 
to the point where it cannot burn. Mines may also be sprayed 
with water to inhibit ignition. 
Good housekeeping practices, namely eliminating the build-up 
of deposits of coal dust that may be disturbed and lead to a 
secondary explosion, also help mitigating the problem. 
For this reason the measures available for such locations are 
limited to: 
 
• Avoidance or restriction of substances which are 
capable of forming an explosive atmosphere. 
• Avoidance or restriction of release of the flammable 
substances and therefore formation of explosive mixtures. 
 
SECONDARY EXPLOSION PROTECTION 
 
Action directed at secondary explosion protection aims to 
prevent sources of ignition. The hazard of combustion can 
originate from electrical and mechanical equipment, or even 
from persons. In practice, secondary explosion protection is 
implemented by technical action and organizational action. 
Organizational action may take the form of instructing the 
workforce and having plant and equipment cleaned properly. 
 
TERTIARY EXPLOSION PROTECTION 
 
Action directed at tertiary explosion protection aims to negate 
the harmful effects of explosions and thus minimize the risks 
to the health of workers. 
Such action could be: 
 Explosion pressure-resistant design 
 Passive and active explosion barriers 
 Automatic extinguisher systems 
 Organizing escape routes 
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Fig. 2. Protection steps in coal mines 
 
The aim of the protection measurements is to prevent, once 
explosion had started, this one will become increasingly 
important when propagating. It should be pointed out that 
secondary explosions of coal dust that happen after the 
primary ignition are really devastating, since they imply very 
big quantities of combustible matter, they generate devastating 
energies and are capable of propagating along kilometers of 
galleries. It is obvious that an explosion can be stopped as 
soon as possible, there are fewer consequences resulting. 
 
I. 2-BAR EXPLOSION PROOF VENTILATION STRUCTURE 
 
The standard UNE-EN 14591-1:2005 [4] Explosion 
prevention and protection in underground mines - Protective 
systems - Part 1: 2-bar explosion proof ventilation structure 
defines the characteristics of the ventilation structures (air 
locking box and ventilation doors) that must provide an 
apropriate ventilation flow in case an explosion occurrence, to 
limit the effects of the explosion in the ventilation systems and 
to preserve escape and rescue possibilities. 
This Explosion proof ventilation structure is capable to resist 
explosion overpressure up to 2 bar that implies at least an air 
locking box, that cuts the roadway section leaving an opening 
for transport, passage of personnel , conveyor belts, pipelines 
and cables, as well as necessary openings to assure necessary 
ventilation airflow. 
The materials and components used for ventilation doors must 
be non-combustible and approved for use in underground 
mining, according to the dimensions defined in the standard. 
They must be embedded in the gables with a minimum depth 
of 250 mm in all its perimeter. Ventilation doors can be for 
passage of personnel or transport and must withstand a 
pressure of 2 bar. Two types of doors maust be distinguished: 
pressure relief vent doors (those whose leaves are opened and 
closed in opposite directions) and non pressure relief doors 
(normally open against the direction of air flow with 
mechanical devices for opening and closing). Figure 3 depicts 
ventilation doors for personal and protective transport.  
 




Fig. 3. Ventilation doors 
 
 
II. PASSIVE AND ACTIVE EXPLOSION BARRIERS 
An explosion should be confined to the area in which it is 
initiated. The alternative to this approach is to attempt to 
protect the entire mine.  
The protection would need to be adequate for well-developed 
explosions; incombustible levels of at least 85% would be 
required throughout the mine. This is believed to be 
impractical. The better approach is to concentrate suppression 
measures close to the likely points of initiation. 
It will be apparent from the comments about stonedusting that, 
while stonedusting is a very effective way of suppressing 
explosions, there may be circumstances in which it is not 
totally effective. Two obvious instances of this are:  
-  roadways in which a conveyor belt is installed, where the 
coal on the belt and the dust generated by movement and 
transfer cannot be protected by stonedusting; and 
-  return roadways, where failure of a trickle duster may allow 
coal dust generated by mining to form a layer on top of 
stonedust. 
In both situations additional protection is required as a backup, 
to make certain that an explosion will not propagate to the rest 
of the mine. At present, this protection should be provided by 
passive barriers. 
There may be other situations which produce likely points of 
initiation of an explosion. These places should be assessed to 
determine whether adequate protection is provided by 
stonedusting alone. If not, these should also be obtained by 
additional protection by barriers. 
Explosion barriers (EN 14591-2) [5] are the essential part of 
the explosion protection system (see Figure 4) in underground 
coal mines, being one of the so called layers of protection. 
A passive barrier relies on the fact that the wind blast from an 
explosion travels ahead of the flame. The energy in the wind 
blast is used to disperse an extinguishing agent -usually water 
or stonedust - into the air in the path of the oncoming flame, 
so that the flame will be extinguished. 
Barriers are rather far protection layer acting in case of failing 
nearer layers. Explosion barriers are divided into two groups 
depending on the extinguishing agent used:  
Simposio Nacional sobre Manejo de Materiales y Peligros Asociados en la Industria HANHAZ2012. 
Thematic Area: Preventive Protection Systems 
 
 
 Stone dust barriers, where incombustible dust (mainly 
calcium carbonate) is used. 





Fig. 4. Explosion barrier 
 
 
Depending on the way of use barriers are divided on: 
 
 Concentrated barriers (protecting determined working 
place where exists explosion ignition sources). 
 
 Distributed barriers (protecting all workings, playing the 
role of inertization. Amount of extinguishing agent on the 
distributed barrier is established to 1 kilogram per cubic 
meter of the space).  
About 70 % of coal mines protected by barriers in Poland and 
in the UK still use stone dust barriers, while water barriers are 
mainly used in Germany, Czech Republic and other European 
countries.  
Deployment of the barriers in the workings had to take into 
account the possible ignition sources of explosion and 
properties of coal dust. 
Water troughs must meet the ATEX Equipment Directive [6]. 
Water can be a very effective agent for flame suppression. It 
has a high heat capacity and an extremely high latent heat of 
vaporization, and absorbs infra-red radiation. In a flame it 
absorbs a large amount of heat by first being heated and then 
by turning to steam. But it is only effective if it is first broken 
into droplets. This is a difference from stonedust, which is 
already present as particles. 
For the water in a trough to become droplets, it must be 
exposed to a sufficiently strong wind blast under favorable 
conditions. To achieve this, the face of the trough and the 
space above the trough must not be shielded from an 
oncoming explosion. This presents a problem of adequately 
supporting the frame without compromising the operation of 
the trough. 
The main advantage of water barriers is the reliable protection 
of workings behind the barrier; there are many examples of 
very effective barrier actions.  
The disadvantages of water barriers are:  
• large dimensions, up to 50 m long;  
• diminishing of the working cross section;  
• need changing barrier position with movement of 
coal faces. 
The problem of ‘weak’ explosions 
Many of the precautions listed above will help to reduce the 
intensity of an explosion. However it is possible for a ‘weak’ 
explosion to propagate. 
A ‘weak’ explosion in this context is not weak in terms of the 
damage it may cause. It refers to explosions at the low end of 
the speed range, with flame speeds from 30 m/s to about 100 
km/h. 
A weak explosion may propagate where reasonable (but 
inadequate) standards of stonedusting have been maintained. It 
could also occur where a fine layer of float coal dust overlies 
stonedust. 
The explosion may not gain in intensity in this region, but it 
may continue to travel. If it manages to bypass other forms of 
protection (such as barriers) and reach the less protected 
roadways further from the face, it may then develop into a 
strong explosion and travel for great distances. 
It is therefore essential that a backup protection, such as a 
barrier, is capable of stopping weak explosions. 
III- AUTOMATIC EXTINGUISHER SYSTEMS 
 
Standard EN 14591-4 [7] defines the characteristics that must 
fulfill the systems installed on roadheader designed to detect 
automatically the initial phase of an explosion of firedamp 
produced by the picks or cutting tools of the roadheader and to 
extinguish next to face roadway, so that the personnel working 
next to the roadheader remains protected. 
The automatic extinction systems consist of a detector or 
transducer which reacts to selected explosion-specific 
phenomenon, for example, ignition, containers with an 
extinguishing agent in the form of powder or liquid and a 
system of control for monitoring with an operational element 
which, in response to an impulse received from the detector, 
puts the system into action and disperses extinguishing agent. 
The main functionality requirements of the system are: 
 High reliability design of operation (fail-proof design). 
 High level of protection against incorrect shot, that 
involves a selective actuation and a minimal sensibility to 
external interferences. 
 Protection Devices against not authorized interventions. 
 Roadheaders operation is only possible with activated 
system. 
 System of error detection. 
The sensors must be sensitive to a physical variable that 
provides the maximum answer speed. Its detection status must 
be exact to the event explosion (not fires) and its reliability has 
not to turn affected by the presence of dust, water or the 
materials used in its construction. 
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Also they must fulfill the Standards according to the 
functional safety (EN 61508-1) [8] and electromagnetic 
compatibility (EN 61000-6-3) [9]. 
The deposits or containers where water is stored must be 
designed so that the discharge speed fits to the geometric 
conditions of the gallery, in particular the distance to the face, 
the radial dimensions of the gallery section and the direction 
of discharge with regard to the axis of the cutting arm. 
There are used systems of extinction of high speed of 
discharge (named in the literature as HRD, high rate 
discharge) that are provided with a quick opening valve, in 
addition to the proper container, a flameproof enclosure and in 
its interior the proper fire extinguisher agent and the propellant 
consisting normally of pressurized gas. 
 
The interval of time needed between the detection of the 
incipient explosion and the valve opening is only 3 ms and 
between the valve opening and the effective discharge of the 
extinguisher agent is comprised between 80 ms and 600 ms. 
Other requisites that must fulfill these systems are: 
 
 To support the mechanical loads of impact and vibration 
(support an acceleration forces equivalent to 5 g). 
 To produce a minimal interference with the work. 
 To leave space for the mechanical equipment: water 
diffusers, platforms 
 Access adapted for maintenance and repair. 
 Simple design that makes servicing easier and more cost 
effective maintenance and routine examination. 
CONCLUSION 
Dust explosion prevention and protection measures can be 
hierarchically organized from most to least effective in terms 
of measures related to: inherent safety (minimization, 
substitution, moderation and simplification), passive 
engineered safety, active engineered safety, and procedural 
safety. 
Consideration of all levels in this hierarchy of controls is 
required for effective dust explosion risk reduction. 
 
All processes should be carefully studied based on the best 
knowledge in this field in order to anticipate potential 
hazardous events and their probability. 
 
Protection means against explosions in underground mines 
should be transformed and continuously improved, with the 
development of methods for estimating risk, improve safety 
management systems, emergency systems and emergency 
response to the potentially affected areas, 
When assessing the risk of explosion and applying the 
protection means against dust explosion it is necessary to 
break away from the "mentality of the gas," and not to seek an 
analogy with explosive gases. 
REFERENCES 
 
[1] A. Szulik, K. Lebecki, and K. Cybulski Chapter 18. Risk of Coal Dust 
Explosion and its Elimination. Proceedings of the Fifth International 
Mining Forum 2004, Cracow - Szczyrk - Wieliczka, Poland, 24-29 
February 2004. 
[2] Amyotte P. R., Eckhoff R. K., Dust explosion causation, prevention and 
mitigation: An overview, Journal of Chemical Health & Safety, 
January/February (2010) 
[3] Guideline for coal dust explosion prevention and suppression, Produced 
by Mine Safety Operations Division, New South Wales Department of 
Primary Industries (2001). 
[4] UNE-EN 14591-1:2005 Explosion prevention and protection in 
underground mines - Protective systems - Part 1: 2-bar explosion proof 
ventilation structure defines the characteristics of the ventilation 
structures 
[5] EN 14591-2 Explosion prevention and protection in underground mines 
- Protective systems - Part 2: Passive water trough barriers 
[6] Directive 94/9/EC on equipment and protective systems intended for use 
in potentially explosive atmospheres (ATEX).  
[7] EN 14591-4 Explosion prevention and protection in underground mines 
- Protective systems - Part 4: Automatic extinguishing systems for road 
headers 
[8] EN 61508-1 Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable 
electronic safety-related systems -- Part 1: General requirements 
[9] EN 61000-6-3 Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) - Part 6-3: Generic 
standards - Emission standard for residential, commercial and light-
industrial environments 
 
